This research aims to develop capability of on-site staffs that can respond to beyond "design basis accident (DBA)" in the sophisticated socio-technical system, in which ensuring safety has been more complicated. Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident is therefore considered as the actual case of "beyond DBA". The authors focused on the actions to prevent the accident progression undertaken by on-site staffs, which were hardly evaluated in existing accident analyses and reports. With reference to the concept of resilience engineering, "Responding" of the four cornerstones was particularly analyzed. Based on the precedent studies, causal factors of modeling "Responding" where pointed out the importance of "Attitude" that is a new lesson learned from on-site response at the accident. In addition, new lessons learned on improvement of skills indicated the limit of the concept of risk removal type safety as a safety goal that human is defined as "a safety hazard element". This led the necessity of the success expansion type of safety as a new safety goal that human is defined as "a resource necessary for system flexibility and resilience". Focusing on "Responding" on-site enabled to deduce core competence by extracting causal factors. Thus, new lessons learned successfully derived introduced for human resource development of the next generation to lead technologies in the society.
CRD is the facility used for withdrawing and inserting control rods in order to control the reactor power. Also, in case of emergnecy, it can be operated by means of an automated reactor protection system signal to quickly insert the control rods into the reactor .
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Loss of function
ホウ酸水注入系（Stand by Liquid Control System） SLC SLC is the system used as a backup to control rods whereby sodium borate solusion which has high capacity for neutron absorption is injected into the reactor to stop the reaction in case of the control rods fail to insert for whatever reason while the reactor is in operartion. Fig. 1 Event tree of unit 3 restoration of the reactor core water injection system and differences of the focused events between accident investigation reports and this research
Analysis of the event tree shows both of the success and the failure groups of actions including in the unit 3 events. In addition, this analysis represents the difference between focused events taken from the accident investigations and this research on resilience engineering aspect. Event tree after the earthquake also clarifies the differences between other units. According to the following conditions, HPCI was manually stopped. 【TEPCO Report】 ① HPCI had not stopped for any reasons, although the discharge pressure had already been off its operating range. (Prominent concern of equipment damage) ② The depressurization of the reactor was possible, which was required after stopping high pressure water injection (Indicator lamp of SRV lighted up) ③ Injecting line switching operation from DDFP had already conducted. * In fact, battery capacity was not enough to operate SRV and water injection line from DDFP
had not yet completed (Miscommunication between on-site workers and operators caused a wrong perception at the time of the accident).
RCIC and HPCI failed to operate due to lack of battery power, however, battery arrangement, including same type of battery used in another unit, was consequently an unpractical solution (The above-mentioned SLC, an alternative high-pressure water injection system, had started for restration work). 【TV Conference】 Depressurization of SRV failed to operate, therefore, attempt to inject nitrogen gas was performed to activate the system. (However, it was not successful due to a structual problem.) 【TEPCO Report】 Injection line using DDFP had completed.
HPCI had a dificulity in starting operation, therefore, related pump was suspended to decrease the battery loard. 【TEPCO Progress Report】
In order to restore a water gauge that was not able to monitor, 24V power source was recovered using 12 batteries (2V) that were delivered from Hirono Thermal Power Station. 【TEPCO Report】 (A water gauge was successfully recovered, however, it was too late until HPCI was manually suspended.)
The Japanese Prime Minister instructed to inject fresh water instead of sea water. According to the following situations, swift steps were taken to switch to sea water. 【Yoshida Interview】 ① Fresh water was available. ② Boric acid can easily be put in fresh water. ③ We thought that less time was required for switching since lineup time for seawater and pure water was estimated. (The situation was different from Unit 1.)
Due to run out of battery to operate SRV, workers at Fukushima brought in car batteries into the Central Control Room. At the same time, they went out purchasing for car batteries with cash collecting from workers and took an action. 【TV Conference】 Thanks to battery saving measure conducted by operators, logic of automatic depressurization system was established. Therefore, multiple SRVs were ready to operate (at about 9:08) to depressurize sucessfully before SRV was usable at 9:50. 【TEPCO Progress Report】 ④Establishment of alternative low pressure water injection system Utilization of fire engine (in two series) and multiple water sources, and solution to reduce a loss when changing the system Soon after ③actions, DDFP line was established. However discharge pressure was low. Therefore, a creative method was devised to increase pressure, which two fire engines were arranged and connected. 【TV Conference】 Two fire engines were secured to be connected in lines. The lineup of seawater as a water source was constituted on-site. *Knowledge of design in which water injection into the reactor from FP line was possible as a countermeasure against AM *Establishment of DDFP line *Lessons-learned that a fire engine was able to use as backup of DDFP (from accident response at Unit 1) *Idea of using two fire engines in lines to increase pressure. *Idea of using back wash valve pit as a source of water injection (fresh water / sea water) *Use of both fresh water and sea water as a source of water injection (Lessons-learned from Unit 1 accident response regarding sea water injection) *Decision of boric acid injection to prevent criticality (fresh water injection at the same time) 
